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I BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT Oí THE PROBLEM
Since the early 1970s and more specifically from 1975 onwards the 
Soviet-Cuban relationship has assumed a meaningful military dimension in 
sub-Saharan Africa The African continent once the exclusive preserve of 
European colonial powers is today, an arena for the Superpowers and for former 
colonial and African regional powers as well With the intrusion of 
extra-continental powers such as the Soviet Union and Cuba a new variable has 
been introduced in the military equation on the African continent More 
specifically, the active collaboration and co-ordination of the Soviet-Cuban 
military machines in the internal civil war of Angola (1975-76) and later in the 
Ethiopian - Somali border war of Ogaden (1977-78) has led many observers to 
postulate grandiose designs on the part of International Communism sponsored 
and supported from the nerve center in Moscow * Cuba as a Communist state 
located m  the Western Hemisphere is consequently seen as a tool or adjunct of 
Moscow - ready and willing to do Moscow s bidding in Third World countries 
While the close congruence of objectives in Africa was facilitated by 
certain systemic factors e g the prevailing atmosphere of 'detente and the 
collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire following the 25 April 1974 
"Captain's Coup" in Lisbon, this rather unusual instance of symbiotic military 
partnership between the Soviet Union and a small developing power like Cuba 
merits a systematic inquiry The Soviet-Cuban military nexus, has impacted 
heavily on the military fortunes of these two states At present besides 
Angola and Ethiopia which claim to be Marxist-Leninist there are in Africa four 
others, and another ten are designated by the USSR as progressive which entails 
a demonstration of socialist orientation' While the Soviet-Cuban military 
presence is felt in these states, it is nowhere as pronounced as in Angola and
22Ethiopia where sizeable Cuban military contingents still remain deployed
II SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
Characterized as a subordinate state system in international relations 
Africa is likely to remain, in the foreseeable future, politically 
economically, and militarily dependent on outside powers for support The 
African state structure is inherently weak and has lately come under increased 
strain due to economic debts crushing refugee problems  ^ border fratricidal 
conflicts due to arbitrary colonial partition schemes,^ and inter-ethnic and 
religious tensions Above all this, is superimposed the phenomenon of 
modernization whicbj has accentuated these problems further Moreover, the 
impotency of regional organizations, such as the OAU (Organization of African 
Unity) and others has led to erosion of regional norms, portending further 
prospects of intervention and counter-intervention by regional^ and 
extra-regional powers  ^ Thus, according to many observers, intra-nation and 
inter-nation conflijct and violence are likely to be dominant in Africa for the 
balance of the century ®
Whether military intervention is brought about by internal factors of 
weakness and internal dissension of states (targets of intervention) or 
occasioned by Big Power rivalry (strategic economic or political), it is 
becoming an increasingly multilateral phenomenon lhat is, Big Powers seldom 
act unilateraly for fear of rival Superpower retaliation and international 
opprobrium As part of their strategy, the Superpowers tend to co-opt and 
enlist their allies for intervention Also, it has been observed that in a 
joint or collaborative interventionary undertaking the intervening actors 
usually have common interests and objectives This is amply manifested in the
iboviet-Cuban military interventions in Africa fo be sure there are 
differences between the two, but they have been able to act within broadly 
defined common goals and objectives However if future interventionary 
behavior is a likely feature of the African sub-system, there will also be 
intra-alliance strains ^
The proxy" or "patron relationship is difficult to identify as reliable 
information of a strictly military nature is not easily available Where such a 
relationship exists the parties are loath to admit it The major partner does 
not like to advertise its domination and control, while the junior partner is 
reticent to acknowledge its subordination and coercion Moreover there are 
some conceptual difficulties as to how much influence a "patron" wields over its 
"proxy" When does a "proxy" act on its own interests as opposed to that of its 
"patron" and what are the "national" or "real" interests of different parties9 
Furthermore "proxies" are not a homogenous group but are differentiated by 
critical differences m  functions and tasks The Cubans, East Germans, North 
Koreans and other East European nations — all m  various capacities are 
performing specialized roles and functions m  Africa
in the case of Cuba its African exploits cover besides strictly combat 
roles, the added functions of a "civic soldier" 10 In Central America, Cubans 
have concentrated more on providing arms, training, and propaganda support to 
various leftist factions (particularly to the ruling regime in Nicaragua and 
opposing leftist factions in El Salvador) ^  The East Germans for their part 
are mainly involved m  a training and advisory capacity, especially pertaining 
to intelligence and security type functions As far as South Yemen is 
concerned, it may serve only one function, i e to provide base facilities 
North Korea has relied on providing military advisory teams, and finally, other
4members of the Lastern bloc (Czechoslovakia Hungary Bulgaria and Poland) 
specialize in the provision of diverse military functions ranging from 
training, support, provision of weapons and internal security ^
This study will try to demonstrate that smaller powers linked to 
Superpowers, can employ the disadvantage of smaller size to their own benefit by 
exercising leverage on some issues vis-a-vis their 'patron in fact, the 
smaller powers aligned to Superpowers have certain assets to their credit, e g 
the ability to concentrate on a single issue, willingness to take greater risks, 
a greater threshold for sacrifice and suffering, if required centralization of 
its decision-making structures, effective use of its natural resources, and 
possibly threatening a new alignment with the opposite Superpower In
addition military interventions by outside powers differ qualitatively 
depending on the size of the intervening power While those by major powers are 
generally related to strategic power balances, ideological, economic diplomatic 
or military interests, for the minor powers the prime motivations for 
interventionary behavior are target regime's incompatibility and border disputes 
arising before independence Therefore, when a major and a minor power have 
participated m  tandem in a military operation m  another country, the goals and 
objectives of the two participating states are often mixed ^
III CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TERMINOLOGY
Since this is a study of the proxy' relationship there is a need to 
operationalise the concept for better understanding Military intervention in 
coming decades, will increase m  scope and frequency, and will more often than 
not take a more indirect dimension ^  The Big Powers will want to influence the 
outcome of internal conflicts of different developing nations by having recourse
5to such multiple instruments as intelligence activities international fronts 
special cultural activities, overt and covert propaganda provision of arms and 
logistical support direct military and political support and advisory training 
in the countries contiguous to the conflict deployment of large military 
formations m  aid of local states and internal security training and 
assistance ^
In tact the term 'proxy'^ has been a recent addition to the vocabulary of 
international relations While 'proxy' behavior is not a new phenomenon in the 
conflict of nations it has come into vogue only after World War II Post-World 
War II developments make 'proxy' expecially employable as a form for a variety 
of reasons In the first place with the advent of nuclear weapons and the 
consequent fear of a strategic nuclear exchange chances of direct confrontation 
between the two Superpowers have receded Secondly 'proxies' it not suiting 
the interests of the Superpowers can be easily disposed of thirdly it is the 
Superpowers who have the capability, interest and will to arm and support these 
'proxies' The states functioning as 'proxies' often choose to identify with a 
Super or a Big Power for economic and security reasons Lately, however, some 
middle ranking powers have attempted to cultivate and promote these 'proxies'
And finally, with the resurgence of nationalism, especially in the Third World, 
the use of direct military threat and intervention by the Superpowers provokes 
resentment and condemnation Hence one way to circumvent criticism is for the 
Super Power to act indirectly through its intermediaries or 'proxy' forces to 
further its global interests
Much of the conceptual ambiguity of the term arises from a failure to 
distinguish between 'proxy' as a classification of interstate relationship 
(e g , X is a 'proxy' of Y) and proxy as a mode of strategic maneuver (eg X
6intervened in Y through "proxy ) When we use the term "proxy as a bilateral 
relationship between two states it invariably means the following
(1) lhat it is coerced, controlled or directed by the patron state
(2) That it is acting as a substitute for another state
(3) That its interests are subservient to the 'patron power and it is 
principally serving those interests,
(4) That there is some commonality of interests between the two parties
However, in the case of "proxy" as a strategic maneouver it leads to a
less restrictive definition Although there is still the element to cater for 
the principal partner's preponderant interest and collusive behavior for 
intervention, it does not necessarily follow that the "patron" will or can 
control the "proxy" Relatedly it is instructive to differentiate between a
"proxy and an ally' In the case of the latter, there is a perceived 
commonality of interests or objectives combined with an element of a voluntary 
and willing co-operation
According to Walter Laqueur, the use of 'proxies has been "the most 
interesting, innovative, and, on the whole the most effective technique" the 
Soviets have employed m  the Third World ^  As mentioned above, one way of 
indirect intervention is not to act alone but to delegate responsibility to 
someone else entirely or in part in the words of Vanneman and James
In a proxy war the armed forces of one nation serve the 
interests of another nation The principal power is the 
sponsor in the sense that its material support makes the 
venture possible (emphasis added) and its clear disapproval 
would seriously deter the proxy from embarking on the 
venture ^
7The extant literature speaks of these types of relationships in different 
and sometimes confusing terminology A country which intervenes on behalf of a 
Super Power is, for example, sometimes characterised as a tool' puppet', 
'satellite' 'surrogate' 'agent', 'pawn', or using a somewhat milder 
expression its 'client' Although there are many turns of this expression used 
by both the Superpowers the most common and frequently used in professional 
literature is that of 'proxy' or 'satellite We shall use these terms in the 
course of our analysis in this study
It would be proper here to highlight the difference between a satellite 
and a 'proxy' - thought to be synonymous by some scholars While 'satellite' 
nations like e g , East Germany may perform many functions of surrogates' or 
'proxies' m  providing training missions, intelligence missions and tasks of 
internal security to some Third World countries m  the Middle East and Africa 
their form and nature of relationship is quite distinct from that of a 'proxy' 
'Proxy' states have the discretion to terminate the relationship with its 
'patron' whenever desired from its 'patron' or 'principal' and in addition, 
wield more leverage than the 'satellites' ^0 As an illustration, it is 
unthinkable for any of the Eastern bloc countries and now even Afghanistan 
(which forms a part of the Soviet security zone) to act independently in face of 
direct Soviet military presence On the other hand 'proxies' (if we use them 
in the commonly ascribed meanings) can threaten disengagement and enjoy greater 
leverage over 'patron' power in foreign policy behavior The classic example 
being that of Cuba
8IV LITERAIURE REVIEW 01 PROXY'/"PATRON' RELATIONSHIP 
CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION
Many writers have developed hypotheses on the nature and pattern of the 
Soviet-Cuban relationship in Africa as demonstrated through the conjoint 
military operations in Angola and Ethiopia
One school of thought sees Cuba as an indebted, compliant and servile state 
of the USSR and hence a 'proxy' or 'surrogate' in Africa and elsewhere This 
proxy' thesis is manifest, particularly in the various policy forums of the 
U S government 21 The same theme of Soviet 'hegemony' and Cuban 'capitulation 
is seen m  the writings of Jorge Dominguez 22 Dominguez is a noted author of a 
number of articles on the domestic roots of Cuban foreign policy Also U S 
senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY)23 has termed the Cubans as the 'Gurkhas 
of the Russian Empire'2^ This 'surrogate' thesis becomes quite pronounced in 
the monographs of the Institute for the Study of Conflict (London) by e g 
David Rees and Brian Cozier 25 The same thesis is implicit in the earlier 
analyses of Peter Vanneman and Martin James 26 An Australian writer T B 
Millar, in the same vein, opines that the Cubans are little more than 
mercenaries m  thin disguise 22 LiRewise, A Suarez and Lars Bondstam2^ echo 
the same theme in their writings on the Soviet-Cuban nexus in Africa
Among the implications of the 'Soviet-surrogate' thesis is that Cuba not 
only takes orders from Moscow regardless of its own interests, but also that the 
USSR should be held accountable for Cuban involvement in the Third world In 
point of fact, most of the writers advocating the 'dependency' or 
'proxy/surrogate' thesis take the Soviet military invasion of Czechoslovakia of 
August 1968 and Castro's endorsement (which is open to different
9interpretations) as a benchmark event According to most of these writers this 
marked a breakpoint event and henceforth Cuba had no independent will or 
volition of its own and was too eager to do Moscow's bidding ^9 £n this 
connection, it is germane to point out the latest study from the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University in which Taylor and 
Townsend propound the same well-worn thesis of Cuba as 'an archetype of a 
proxy '
Another school those of the revisionists if we may so characterise them 
posit the thesis that the Cubans are a self-directed, revolutionary nation which 
has taken upon themselves the role of 'socialist internationalism or 
'proletarian internationalism' to combat 'international imperialism by 
providing moral and material support to the 'liberation movements' in the Third 
World particularly m  Africa, the Caribbean and Central America This argument 
can be gleaned from testimony by Lourdes Casal in the Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on International 
Relations 31 Another writer, Nelson Valdes^ hews the same line as above 
Finally African Sovietologists such as Nolutshunghu take a more sympathetic 
view of Cuba as 'more of an independent maverick' than the Soviet's 
catspaw
In a rather well-documented and frequently quoted article on this subject 
William Durch^ traces the roots of Cuban military involvement in the Third 
World (Algeria, Vietnam and Syria) and other lesser military missions in Africa 
prior to Angola A somewhat analogous analysis of Cuban African activities in 
chronological order is provided by Jorge I Dominguez 35 The same line of 
argument is also taken up by Connell-Smith-^ who views Cuban relations with the 
Third World predating the Soviet Union and concludes, that during the last
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twenty years Castro has been much less of a "puppet' than the pre-independence
Cuban leaders of the U b Jin Valenta^ plays down Moynihan's metaphor of the
Cubans as the "Gurkhas of the Russian Empire In his assessment, it is more a
case of congruence of common objectives and goals of allies between the Cubans
and the Soviets - at least m  the case of Angola, if not later in Ethiopia
Yet another study by William Leo Grande^ traces U S -Cuban relations, and
ends on a prescriptive note At one point it mentions serious discrepancies in
the Soviet-Cuban policy outlook in the 1970s According to Le Grande's
analysis, the Soviet and Cuban perspectives diverged on some policy issues m
Angola and Ethiopia For example, in Angola, the Cuban troops helped the late
President Agostmho Neto's moderate faction of the MPLA to defeat the 1977 coup
attempt by Nito Alve's pro-Soviet faction Also m  the case of Ethiopia there
were significant policy differences between the Cubans and the Soviets over
committing Cuban troops against Eritrean 'insurgency' in the northern province
of Eritrea, adjacent to the Red Sea In other words, while the Soviets pressed
hard for a military solution through the use of massive military force m  the
solution of the Eritrean question, the Cubans insisted on a political settlement»
in view of their previous support for the Eritrean cause of self-determination 
Going even further back, the Cuban brand of militant , revolutionary 
overthrow of regimes in Latin America m  the 1960s, did not go well with the 
more circumspect and cautious Soviet approach This, sometimes, led to bitter 
exchanges of doctrinal debate and polemics Furthermore, on other international 
issues such as Cuba's zealous advocacy of the New International Economic Order 
as leader of the Non-Aligned Movement m  the Third World, the Soviet support has 
remained at best, lukewarm and unenthusiastic Of particular note is the issue 
of nuclear proliferation where the Soviets have been extremely conservative on
11
the question of passing nuclear technology to the developing countries And 
last but not least the Soviets though ready and quick to exploit any domestic 
turmoil in the Caribbean and Central America, are reluctant to have more Cubas' 
in the region and therefore quite unwilling to further underwrite the increasing 
costs of 'socialist construction' This is mainly due to their past repeated 
failures in the Third World region with its intractable problems together with 
increased strains on the Soviet economy in recent years ^ 9
ihe same perspective of Cuban independence of will and action is 
highlighted in Vanneman and Martin ^0 They suggest that this is especially true 
in the case of Ethiopia Likewise Bissell s ^  opinion about Egypt s military 
intervention in South Yemen (1962-68) sensitises us to regional interests rather 
than the Soviet sponsorship In a similar vein, writers like Halperin 2^ 
Klmghof fer Skurnik,^ and Treverton^ advance the same above - mentioned
general thesis of Cuban autonomous-cum-self directed behavior
The third perspective, which is more intellectually appealing to us, is 
spelled out by Edward Gonzeles m  his later writings Explicitly combining the 
above two theses, he terms it as the 'paladin thesis '^6 This thesis maintains 
that Cuba must necessarily capitalise upon Soviet interests and objectives in 
the Third World, and in the process continue to advance its own interests This 
thesis sees Cuba's motives as complex According to this view, by linking 
itself with the Soviet Union and also the Third World in Latin America and 
Africa, it increases its leverage with both This leverage may mean as argued 
by Lawrence H Theriot,attracting more economic and military aid from the 
Soviet Union Or, it may enable it to derive a greater degree of independence 
or given its assets, exercize more meaningful influence over Soviet policy in 
Africa or to mobilize its population for 'internationalist duties' in Africa as
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a foreign policy success - thus gaining legitimacy for the Castro regime This 
point is well taken by another observer who sees Cuba's internationalism closely 
linked to the nature of the regime and its continuity a major tenet of its 
foreign policy being the 'irreversibility of the Cuban revolution' and thus the 
survival of the regime itself ^  the same context James Nelson Goodsell
quotes a World Bank Cubanologist who remarked
fhe desires of both Cuba and the Soviet Union may coincide, 
and Cuba may be providing the troops that the Soviet Union is 
not would not provide But Cuba could not be there if it 
didn t want to be ^
The same theme was echoed by Brigadier-General James A Williams Deputy 
Director for Estimates in the Defence Intelligence Agency, certainly not an 
impartial observer when he testified at the 1978 House of Representatives 
Hearings
I think, sir, that some of this zeal on the part of the Cubans 
who see themselves as the model for the Third World and 
developing nations truly believe that theirs is the way to 
go 50
Further, the very fact of Soviet 'expansionist' policy in the African 
continent allows Cuba some degree of influence over its patron because of its 
instrumental role in furthering those objectives These objectives in the 
assessment of the same writer, could not be achievable by the Soviets alone in 
Africa
Another observer on Cuban foreign policy behavior m  the Third World 
(particularly Latin America and Africa), Carla Robbins,cites Cuba's 
Afro-Spanish heritage and Third World revolutionary credentials as motivating 
factors in its African exploits Rather than being commissioned by the Soviet
13
Union to do the dirty' job argues the writer it was the mating of common 
objectives and the provision of Soviet military and economic wherewithal with 
availability of Cuban combat contingents which made joint Angola and Ethiopian 
military operations a success
Assigning merit to the Cuban initiatives m  Africa Carla Robbins cites the 
fact that the Cubans despite all the concessions to the Soviet Union after late 
1960s did not for a moment yield m  their unstinted support for African 
liberation movements In fact, as she argued 'if there had been any radical 
change it was in Moscow s policy toward Africa not Havana's 1 Continuing 
further in the same study she states that Moscow's decision to join forces with 
Havana in late 1975 by the airlift of Cuban troops to Angola and provision of 
arms and equipment constituted a significant change where Moscow actually
seemed to be following Havana's lead - not the other way round ^2
And finally another observer of Cuban foreign policy behavior in Africa, 
Merritt Robins, explained Cuba's assertiveness and activist posture in Africa m  
mid-1970s as an attempt to end its isolation, secure allies and end its 
'embarrassing one-way dependence" on the Soviet Union by serving as the bridge 
between the Soviet bloc and the Third World and implicitly repaying the massive 
debt to the USSR with military diplomacy as the medium of exchange ^3
V CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION SMALL STA1E VS BIG STATE
One is tempted to see in the Cuban-Soviet relationship a prime example of a 
small vs big state interaction If for example, during the 1960s the Cubans 
were actively challenging the Soviet Union on various foreign policy issues, it 
becomes difficult to understand how and why they should be subservient to them 
in the 1970s We postulate the thesis that as a small power, Cuba has
14
maintained substantial leverage and bargaining position over its 'patron the 
Soviet-Union Moreover Cuba s assertive role m  Africa in the mid-1970s was 
occasioned not so much by Soviet dictate or direction Many factors were 
responsible e g the systemic environment of the Superpower's near strategic 
equivalence the prevailing atmospherics of 'detente', the Portuguese hasty 
decision to décolonisé the post-Vietnam and Watergate syndrome Moreover 
Cuba historically, had already established links with the revolutionary 
movements in Lusophone Africa since the early 1960s and there was now a 
propitious opportunity to act And finally, there was the rise of the 
non-aligned movement which Castro was eager to lead
Over the last decade certain international relations theorists have 
focussed on small powers 54 one thesis from this literature particularly 
appropriate to the Cuban case is Albert Hirschraan's 'dependency management 
which suggests that under certain conditions a smaller power may come to 
exercize greater leverage over its bigger partner, given its negotiating skill, 
and political conditions Also even the strength with which the interests are 
held may give the dependent or client state more power to choose than the 
overall structure of inequality would suggest 55
As regards the often mentioned issue of 'exploitation' by the stronger 
against the small, there is little empirical evidence to demonstrate it 
Sometimes, it is said, the bigger power may willingly wi^h to be 'exploited by 
smaller states in international transactions First, as William Riker claims 
the bigger power collects some sort of illusory psychological returns for being 
the 'greatest' in exchange for what it is forced to pay off its more sensible 
patron with real or tangible benefits, secondly acording to Olson and 
Zeckhauser the collective goods of an alliance or of any other international
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relationship selfishly mike more sense for the largest single member of the 
whole such that it will make disproportionate efforts to keep the entire 
structure going thirdly as to why larger states are likely to do small state s 
bidding is that some sort of ideological concern for others got the large state 
to become larger in the first place And finally based on the strength or 
weakness principle it is the smallest side which is least willing to yield on 
concessions and can threaten re-alignment or even its extinction thus sometimes 
raising its bargaining stakes in fact the extant literature offers five
basic approaches to the definitional problem of a small state First some 
writers totally reject the concept of definition because of the insufficiencies 
of the concept as an analytical tool A second group of writers laments the 
problems and difficulties of definition and remains very skeptical as to the 
operationalisation of the concept Among these are included Annette Baker Fox 
V Sveics Mario Hirsh and 1 Mathisen A third approach tries to 
operationalise the concept through employment of some tangible variables like 
population area GNP and size and number of the armed forces This view is 
advanced by among others, Peter Wiles, Ronald Barston, Simon Kuznets J 
Rapapport, L Mateba and J Therattil A fourth group relates to the perceptual 
aspect i e , those states which perceive themselves to be small The works of 
R Keohane and R Rothstein, fall in this category The fifth approach 
seemingly an eclectic one, integrates all the above criteria and is 
characterized prominently in the works of R Vayrnyen and M Handel
For purposes of our study, the empirical referents for a small state would 
include indices like 1) Low rank/status as measured by either objective (hard) 
or subjective (perceptual) data (2) limited economic and military capability
(
l b
hence dependence and vulnerability to external threats and (J) limited scope of 
interests
VI SELLC11VE USE OF ItRM "PROXY'
While going through the literature on the patron-client" relationship - at 
least in the case of Africa, one is struck by the importance given to the Soviet 
Union while the role of the U S  is either considered less interesting or less 
extensive Of course a perusal of the Soviet press and publications reverses 
this image and tends to go to the other extreme in this regard, some observers 
feel that the discussion should be focused on other levels of analyses i e 
not on the international level alone ^8
As an illustration Girling5  ^mentions at least two cases of American 
"proxy" relationships in civil wars Taiwan acting as a "proxy" m  Burma 
between 1950 and I960, and South Africa during the civil war in Angola in 
1975-76 An another example of "proxy" intervention is mentioned by Towle60 
when he refers to the relationship between France and Morocco in connection with 
the civil war in the Shaba province of Zaire In Shaba I (April 1977) the 
Moroccan troops flew in American trench and Belgian aircraft this becomes more 
so in the case of Shaba II (May 1978), where an inter-African force of Moroccan 
and Senegalese was supported by contingents from Togo Ivory Coast the 
Gameroons, and Gabon to support the incumbent Mobutu regime in Zaire 
Furthermore there have been instances of military intervention by regional 
military powers like Tanzania against Uganda's Amin in North Africa Egypt s 
military intervention in the South Yemen War (196Z-6/) involving nearly 80 000 
troops, also Egypt's supportive intervention in Sudan against southern 
secessionistic civil war and Libya s interventions m  neighboring Chad 61
i 7
An analogous example in this controversy of patron-proxy could be cited 
that of the U S -Israel relationship It hardly needs emphasis that the 
security and indeed survival of the present state of Israel could not have been 
possible without the active U S military, economic and political support 
Needless to say Israel's geo-political location m  the Arab heartland and deep 
emotional ties make it as a matter of vital interest' to the U S foreign 
policy - thus accounting for this 'special relationship
Yet when the Soviet Union or other Communist or even Arab nations 
castigate the Israelis as pawns' of the U S , it is rejected peremptorily both 
by the U S its allies and Israel But as recent events in the Middle East m  
the early 1980s have amply demonstrated the Israelis have not hesitated to take 
some bold actions in line with their own national self-interest and contrary to 
U S interests Of particular note is the pre-emptive strike against Iraq's 
nuclear facilities (June 1981) preemptive military surgical strike in Lebanon 
(June 1982) and assiduous consolidation of settlements on the Western Bank and 
Gaza All these were purportedly in definance of U S policies and desires of 
effecting reconciliation in the region ^2
Likewise South Africa's military strike in Angola in 1976 and subsequent 
punitive surgical attacks deep in Angolan and Mozambiquean territories since 
1981 have been motivated by their own security concerns much to the discomfiture 
of the U S Administration If this is added to South African go-slow and 
sometimes foot-dragging anti-apartheid policies domestically U S faces 
increased risk of condemnation by Black African states and other Third World 
countries for failure of its 'constructive engagement policy in South Africa 
In our opinion there emerges from the foregoing discussion a kind of a 
synthesis of a mutual exploitation' thesis A perceptive study m  this
ib
context is by David Ronteldt who detines one particular torm of small state 
with his notion ot 'super-clients 64 According to this concept the very tact 
of being publicly proclaimed as a 'client' of that Superpower gives that country 
a special privileged status And, if that countLy is like former Shah's Iran 
for the U S and present day Cuba for the Soviet Union it is bestowed based 
on its geo-political salience a 'super-client status Having thus invested in 
that smaller state its prestige it becomes rather obligatory upon that 
Superpower to support defend and ensure the survival of that state Further 
the status of this 'super-client' increases when the ideological atmosphere is 
ideologically polarized or it is endowed with some unique geo-political or 
resource assets or when its ethnic lobbies are firmly lodged in the 'patron 
state or when the potential loss ' of the client threatens to become 
significant for symbolic reasons
Nonetheless it need not imply that a smaller power' can always manipulate 
the Superpower to its advantage For the Superpower on its part, may also take 
a few precautions as a safeguard For example, it may not give a blank cheque 
to its smaller ally set limits to its behavior through moral pressure 
withholding ot economic aid, or if worse comes to worst, retaliate with force to 
inflict punishment Also a smaller power may use the stratagem of threatening 
its collapse or extinction as a ploy for extorting military and economic aid 
But this could be a risky venture, for in the event of being lightly taken or 
ignored by that Superpower it could mean a total future loss of bargaining
power
Applying the above super-client'analogy to the Cuban case we find that 
the Soviet Union has come to place a high stake in its ideological premise of 
the notion of irreversibility of socialist revolutions 65 This has led the 
Soviet Union to be generally consistent and steadfast in support of the 
Communist-installed regimes particularly m  Eastern Europe That primarily 
explains its military interventions around its peripheral areas (Hungary 1956 
Czechoslovakia 1968 and Afghanistan 1979) and forward projection of military 
power by intervening in tandem with Cuba in Angola and Ethiopia Although there 
is no formal military treaty between the Soviet Union and Cuba the Soviet 
commitment is guaranteed through the maintenance of a 300Û man strong brigade 
permanently based m  Cuba, together with 1600 military advisors and technical 
personnel and further 3000 Soviet employed civilians In addition Bear-D 
maritime reconnaissance planes MiG-21 184 Fishbeds of various types 37 MiG-23 
BN, 23 BN Flogger-Fs and an interceptor squadron of 15 MiG-23 Flogger-Es are 
deployed on the island-nation 66 0n the economic side, the Soviet Union 
maintains economic leverage through export of oil at subsidized rates market 
for Cuban sugar, and membership in CMEA
Despite policy differences the Soviet Union seems committed to guarantee 
Cuba's survival as a socialist state Like Israel for the U S , Cuba has 
behaved at times like a recalcitrant ally, but the Soviets have paid this price 
to demonstrate to its arch-rival the U S , its Warsaw Pact allies Third World 
'socialist oriented' nations and the developing nations at large that it is 
generally a steady and steadfast partner Although Brezhnev's predecessors 
Khrushchev and Stalin reconciled to the rupture of ties with its socialist 
allies like China and Yugoslavia, it seems difficult to believe that 
post-Chernenko leadership wíl do likewise with Cuba under any conceivable
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circumstances
Again there is a caveat to the above thesis We do not postulate that 
cuba is dictating the Soviet foreign policy behavior That will seem going to 
the other end of the spectrum lo be sure, the Soviets, as befits a Superpower 
have also kept Castro in line by keeping him in power through military and 
economic support Also they have prevented him from becoming too 
self-sufficient as to challenge the USSR Further they have been able to 
harness and capitalize Castro's image and influence in the Third World to 
support their otherwise difficult-to-achieve ambitions and foreign policy goals 
particularly in Africa and Latin America in the late 1970s In sum through the 
Cuban medium, they have garnered at least in the initial stages some sympathy 
and recognition from most of the African nations via their support tor 
liberation struggle in Lusophone Africa
Generally speaking over the years the world system has tended towards 
greater polycentrism New nations have, in the process for a variety of 
factors been able to exercize leverage vis a vis their patron powers Of 
course their foreign policies have been circumscribed through supply and 
control of military and economic aid by these donor pwoers yet these recipient 
nations have sometimes very able capitalized on their unique geo-strategic 
location resource capabilities, diversified arms procurement options and 
improved more indigenous weapons production capabilities For the Superpowers 
the need tor foreign exchange through sales of arms upkeep of their R and D 
capabilities and increased competition among other suppliers - has all made the 
recipients more flexible in their decision making Furthermore global powers 
have global interests and have need for base rights intelligence and 
surveillance requirements protection of threatened scarce raw materials and
2 i
mineral resources imperatives ol alliances to keep the balance ol power with 
their adversary and sometimes need lor testing their weaponry m  battle 
conditions All these argue for a kind ol "reverse dependence " on their 
proteges and hence the latter s enhanced bargaining position 67 Moreover 
Superpowers may also require the services of "proxies" to further their 
interests as war between proxies is probably less likely to escalate to 
nuclear war whereas a direct confrontation between Superpowers runs that risk
VII PROXY/ALLILS/MhRCLNARIbS COhTRADiClIONS AND AMBIGUITIES
A close scrutiny of many studies of this Soviet-Cuban military nexus in 
Africa reveal that many writers remain ambivalent about the use of these terms 
lor example two very recent studies bearing on this relationship suffer trom 
such typical contradictions As an example Taylor and Townsend*^ characterize 
"proxy" as a symbiotic albeit lopsided relationship" But continuing in the 
same context, they term Cuba as 'the archetype of proxy" and mention that the 
Cubans are stationed in Africa not due to any revolutionary bent, but because of 
Soviet military assistance and Kremlm"s approval ^9
Another writer Bruce Porter, hews the same line in his recent book and 
comments
the Soviet-Cuban relationship, as tar as it pertains to Third 
World conflicts has not been so much that of a commander and 
subordinate as that of a highly dependent Soviet ally obliging 
its mentor with enthusiasm
On another occasion in the same work, he cites Cuba's ideological links 
close party ties and heavy economic dependence on the Soviet Union as cogent 
reasons for Cuban "proxy status and behavior m  Africa
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Illustrative is the case also of the Strategic Survey 1978 where again 
there seems some equivocation While Cuba's role in the Angolan civil war is 
seen as that of a 'surrogate force through Soviet long range projection 
capabilities m  the same place by way of summary it is referred to as 
Soviet-Cuban 'partnership' ^  However in the same context, when other examples 
are enumerated of small powers which when provided with aid, have operated at 
great distances from their own territories (e g Belgium, Senegal, and Morocco) 
m  the invasion of Shaba province of Zaire (1977-7B) the expressions used are 
quite different ihey are like for instance Irench-Moroccan and U S -French 
co-operation '
Another U S government study Annual Report to the Congress - 1Y 1986 
invariably equates 'proxies for 'allies' while discussing Soviet power 
projection capabilities in the Third world -^3
Likewise K L Adelman sees the successful Soviet-Cuban military 
interventions as having been consummated through 'Cuban mercenaries and Russian 
arms' nonetheless the two above-mentioned French-Moroccan interventions are 
euphemistically termed as 'rescue operations' ^4
A still another study of Soviet military aid to Africa by Major Bruce 
Arlmghaus synonymously uses the terms 'allies' with 'surrogates ' While the 
author headlines his title as 'Soviet surrogate', in his subsequent narration 
and description of events, he tends to counter his own categorization And to 
cap it all in his conclusive remarks sums up thusly
Even the closest Soviet allies m  the region - the hast 
Europeans and the Cubans (emphasis added) - are not mere 
puppets of the Soviet policy Each appears to pursue, within 
limitation its own economic and political goals in the 
region ^5
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Proceeding further in the same vein he also sees North Korea's policies 
and aid programs to the newly independent Zimbabwe in a more independent line 
and tree Irom Moscow's control which would preclude them I North Korea] from 
acting as Soviet surrogates 7®
Aguila and Grabendorff two perceptive observers of Cuban policies in 
Central America and the Caribbean view Cuba as a regional military power 77 
although relying on the Soviet Union For Aguila it is a 'regionally intrusive 
power',70 namely, a nation exhibiting politically significant involvement beyond 
its borders - an involvement determined in turn by its very 'objective power 
motivation location and international position' 7  ^ However, later while 
reviewing Cuba's pro-Soviet tilt m  the NAM (Non Aligned Movement) and identical 
"institutional-organizational and functional-behavioral traits of a Soviet-type 
system ,®0 they tend to reverse their earlier formulations and characterize 
Cuban behavior as 'proxy' of the Soviets ®*
Likewise, Warner succumbs to the same fallacy of equating Soviet's Cuban 
'allies'®^ Wich Soviet sponsored 'surrogates' and 'clients' like the Cubans or 
East Germans ®®
Relatedly, a recent study by the Department of Defence, The Soviet 
Military 1985 faces the same conceptual confusion As an illustration, while 
Cuba is termed as 'Soviet proxy'®^ and other socialist bloc countries as 
'surrogates' and 'clients',®5 they are also referred to as 'counterparts'®® in 
other places
Finally, it would be in order here to deal with the often used term 
'mercenary' - sometimes used synonymously with 'proxy ' In an excellent study, 
a serving U S Defence Intelligence officer, Gerry S Thomas makes five
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functional goupings of military operative types in the African context (1) 
Standing army (2) auxiliary (3) partisan (4) agent and (5) mercenary forces 87 
His typology is as follows
MILITARY OPERAI1VL TYPES88
OPERATIVE LOCAL CITIZEN OWN GOVT SUPPORT
INTEGRATED 
INTO NATIONAL 
STRUCTURE
Army Yes/No Yes Yes
Auxiliary No Yes Yes/No
Agent No Yes No
Partisan Yes No No
Mercenary No No No
According to the above typology a mercenary is
1) Not a citizen of the country for which he is fighting
2) Neither receives nor is sent overt support by his government
3) Takes a direct part m  the hostilities outside the established structure of 
the standing army,
Judged by the above criteria, the Cuban early suppprt to the Lumumbist and 
Mulelist secessionist rebels in Congo in 1964 may be characterized as 'agent 
type of support, but is distinguishable from the large scale combat auxiliary' 
presence in Angola (1973-76) and later m  Ethiopia (1977-78) Theretore it is 
not a case of 'mercenary' force in any of the above three cases 8  ^ Nonetheless, 
the support accorded to UNITA and FNLA, the rival organizations to the MPLA
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through foreign nationals could be termed as "mercenary support" Also the 
Katanga gendarmes sent to overthrow Zaire's Mobutu regime in Shaba crises had 
"mercenary" support
Again perusing the Soviet press and literature one comes across frequent 
use of "Western mercenaries" - invariably blurring their meanings and using it
as a catch-all term for all Western supported revolutionary or guerrilla 
90groups
Vili OPERATIONALIZATION OF TERMINOLOGY
The foregoing discussion has sensitized us to the imperative of fixing 
defined boundaries on these amorphous and easily-bandied-around terms In our 
opinion, "proxy" relationship^ has specific dimensions to it To some 
observers a "proxy intervention" appears to symbolize the interest of the 
principal (A) to the proxy (B) However there has to be some degree of allied 
and compatibility of mutual interests This aspect of interests has already 
been referred to in the literature survey of writers like Bissell Berner 
Connell-Sraith Duncan, Klinghoffer, Millar, Ra"anan, Traverton, Valenta and 
Vanneman and James
Another dimension of "proxy relationship" is the material relationship 
between A and B That is, without material support provided by A to B it would 
not be possible for B to effect intervention on behalf of A Sometimes an 
essential feature of all discussions of 'proxy relationship" is whether A 
exercized influence or power over B However, power as a concept is difficult 
to define It is generally referring to statements like that B is submissive 
to A cannot resist its demands, or accept its directions and the like
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And finally the relationship between A and ß is sometime also connected 
with the idea of co-ordination of activities There is thus as idea of 
burden-sharing or division of responsibilities so that the successful execution 
of intervention is ultimately dependent on the actions of both parties Ihis 
aspect is borne out, for instance in the writings of Bissell and Vanneman and 
James
It is generally assumed that an intervenor intervenes on behalf of another 
power because of positive or negative sanctions (or threats of such sanctions) 
which may be directed against it For as commonly suggested, without such 
sanctions, that supposed intervention may not come about 'Positive sanctions' 
may mean rewards like transfer of resources (military and economic aid), while 
'negative sanctions' may signify either withholding of these benefits or 
punitive measures like trade embargoes and moratoriums
Combining the power and material support relationship, we would rely on 
Duner's typology of supposed proxy relationship ^2 It is as follows
Pressured to Not Pressured
Intervene to Intervene
Receives (is dependent on) 
material support Proxy I Partner
Does not receive (is not 
dependent on) material 
support Proxy 2 Autonomous Actor
This phenomenon of intervention is now divided into four different cases - 
thus making a more differentiated and a nuanced approach to the subject As 
shown above, there are two different types of 'proxies' i e , (Proxy I and Proxy
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2) It hardly needs mention that the one most discussed type in international 
relations is m  the left hand quadrant But from a theoretical angle it is 
equally important to focus attention on the lower left-hand quadrant
The reason why there has always been interest in the first type of proxy 
relationship' is the assumption that in view of the material support received, 
it becomes obligatory for the recipient state to subordinate its interests to 
the patron But as the typology shows it may well be that the intervenor is 
not subservient but may well be acting on its own The literature thus surveyed 
reveals that the Soviet ambitions and activist policies in Africa (Angola and 
Ethiopia) could not have been possible if the junior partner had not chosen to 
physically intervene with its own combat troops As regards the argument that 
Cubans were indebted for Soviet military economic help, it did surely, 
condition Cuban behavior Nonetheless, one has to go beyond these facile 
explanations and appreciate the radical Cuban nationalism and Castro's fierce 
defiance and independently charismatic image in most of the developing 
countries Also, if one chronologically traces the Cuban interest in Africa, 
one finds that due to a variety of reasons (ideological, cultural and ethnic) 
their presence and support to African liberation movements predated those of the 
Soviets— going back, to the mid-1960s
IX CONCLUSION
The focus of this study is on the nature, form and pattern of Soviet-Cuban 
military relationship in Africa This is with particular reference to the two 
case studies of Angola and Ethiopia and we would like to further analyze (in a 
later study) this relationship in light of Duner's typology Admittedly, there 
are not enough of replications of these type of joint Soviet-Cuban military
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co-operation Nonetheless bat>ed on these two case studies we could 
confidently draw some generalizations and should such similar interventions 
take place m  the future the findings could be further tested
The specific question posed in this study is Is this relationship 
basically that of 'patron-client" or mutual partnership or one where the 
junior ally or partner, given its unique assets tends to exercise some leverage 
on its major partner7 There are three main hypotheses which will be tested in a 
later study They are
(1) The greater the expanding global interests of the Soviet 
Union, the greater will be its dependence on allies to act on 
its behalf,
(2) There is no direct correlation between provision of 
economic and military aid and as a consequence subservience of 
the recipient's domestic or even foreign policy policies to 
that of the donor's
(3) Certain regional powers given their unique geostrategic 
assets, may act as autonomous actors (within broad parameters 
of its patron state) and also may exercise 'reverse 
influence'
In closing this study, in a modest way, has broadly surveyed the 
literature on the Soviet-Cuban military nexus m  Africa and laid a theoretical 
framework for subsequent detailed analysis As a policy guideline, the lessons 
learned could perhaps form a basis for the U S or any major power contemplating 
any 'anticipatory involvement'^3 m  a bid to avert likely future Third World 
conflicts Needless to say, it is easier said than done lor m  the complex 
protean reality of the dynamics of ferment and change affecting most of the 
developing world primarily which is indigenous and autonomous and hence beyond 
the Superpowers to completely influence or control
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